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Article

Matching Political Contributions
Spencer Overton†
INTRODUCTION
Traditional public financing of campaigns is in trouble.
Successful candidates have increasingly rejected public financing because it provides inadequate funding and limits candidate spending.1 In an attempt to revive the idea, several states
and localities adopted provisions that gave additional “equalizing funds” to publicly financed candidates so they could remain
competitive with privately financed opponents.2 In June 2011,
however, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down Arizona’s version of this provision,3 reasoning that it discouraged the speech
of privately financed candidates.4

† Professor of Law, The George Washington University Law School. Michael Abramowicz, Eleanor Brown, Anupam Chander, Tom Colby, Chris
Edley, Roger Fairfax, Heather Gerken, Rick Hasen, Sam Issacharoff, Larry
Lessig, Amy Loprest, Michael Malbin, Bill Marshall, Mimi Marziani, Nick
Nyhart, Dan Ortiz, Rick Pildes, Adam Skaggs, Peter Smith, Benjamin Spencer, Dan Tokaji, Amanda Tyler, Adam Winkler, and Fane Wolfer provided
helpful comments that allowed me to develop this Article. Rachel Applestein,
Benjamin Kapnik, and Stephanie Rodriguez contributed invaluable research
assistance. Copyright © 2012 by Spencer Overton.
1. See infra text accompanying notes 45–50 (discussing how candidates
have increasingly opted out of the presidential public financing system).
2. See infra note 52 and accompanying text (discussing examples of these
provisions).
3. Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct.
2806, 2829 (2011). The author edited and signed onto an amicus brief in Arizona Free Enterprise that argued the Court should allow state and local innovation with tools like supplemental funding triggers to improve campaign finance laws. See Brief for Constitutional and Election Law Professors as Amici
Curiae Supporting Respondents, Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC
v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011) (Nos. 10-238, 10-239), 2011 WL 686402
[hereinafter Brief for Professors].
4. See Ariz. Free Enter., 131 S. Ct. at 2813 (holding the Arizona law at
issue violative of the First Amendment).
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The Court’s decision in Arizona Free Enterprise v. Bennett
deals a significant blow to traditional public financing.5 But rather than give up the fight, reformers should seize the decision
as an opportunity to transform their entire approach. Public financing should no longer aim to purge private money from politics. Instead, it should encourage as many private citizens as
possible to participate in financing politics. Increased participation makes government more accountable and responsive to the
people as a whole, and it facilitates individual autonomy and
self-governance.6 Just as civic norms encourage all citizens to
vote,7 a key goal of public financing should be to encourage everyone to make a financial contribution to a political candidate
of his or her choice.
Conventional reformers and press accounts suggest that
“there is too much money in politics”8—but they are wrong. The
real problem is that the money comes from too few people.
While 64% of eligible Americans voted in the November 2008
election, only 10% typically give to political campaigns, and less
than 0.5% are responsible for the bulk of the money that politicians collect from individual contributors.9
Unfortunately, conventional public financing has made this
problem worse by suppressing participation. Had Barack
Obama participated in the public financing program for the
2008 general election, for example, his campaign would not
have been able to collect even a $5 contribution from a donor,
and he would not have attracted an unprecedented 2.7 million
small donors.10 Perhaps more important, Obama also would
have sacrificed thousands of volunteer organizers who engaged
in voter registration, door-to-door canvassing, and phone banking, as studies show donating even small amounts develops
bonds to a movement that lead to other forms of grassroots
engagement.11

5. While the Court in Arizona Free Enterprise did not invalidate all traditional public financing programs, its decision made most traditional public
financing schemes unworkable. See infra notes 53–58 and accompanying text.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 59–61.
7. See id.
8. See, e.g., George F. Will, ‘Campaign Reform’ Means ‘Shut Up!’, N.Y.
POST, Feb. 3, 2012, http://www.nypost.com/p/news/opinion/opedcolumnists/
campaign_reform_means_shut_up_BlibKnKWSaIdQYGy7fg2TL.
9. See infra notes 60–61 and accompanying text.
10. See infra note 65 and accompanying text.
11. See infra note 71 and accompanying text.
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This Article navigates this new legal and political order
and maps out the future of public financing. The way forward
requires an overhaul of public financing that spurs greater participation by the public at large.
Specifically, the answer lies in a system that gives a multiple match to donor contributions. Rather than continuing to
give each candidate a flat grant of $100,000, for example, public
financing systems should give six-to-one multiple matching
funds on the first $200 of a contribution. This would make a
$200 contribution worth $1400 to a candidate.
Multiple matching funds reflect a philosophical shift about
the role of money in politics. Money is not an “evil,” but should
be embraced as a tool to make government accountable to more
people. Public financing should not “level the playing field”12
among candidates, but should reward candidates who mobilize
more supporters. Reformers need to spend less energy on “getting big money out of campaigns” and more on “getting the people back in” to those very same campaigns.13
Multiple matching funds address the core challenge to financial political participation—a lack of income.14 Financial
constraints determine who gives money.15 Individuals with
family incomes over $100,000 represented 11.1% of the population in 2004, cast 14.9% of the votes, and were responsible for
approximately 80% of political contributions over $200.16
Participation rates are also low because candidates face
lower transaction costs in mobilizing larger contributions from
a narrow group of higher-income Americans.17 Studies show
that mobilization is a major factor in financial participation
(people asked to give are much more likely to do so), and fundraisers find that they can raise more money by targeting larger
contributors.18 “Why should I call ten people and ask for $100
each,” many candidates and fundraisers ask, “when it takes me
less time to call one person and ask for $1000?”19
12. See Ariz. Free Enter., 131 S. Ct. at 2825 (rejecting a “state interest in
‘leveling the playing field’”).
13. David Donnelly, We Need More Citizen Participation, BOS. REV.,
Sept.–Oct. 2010, http://www.bostonreview.net/BR35.5/donnelly.php.
14. See infra note 78 and accompanying text.
15. See infra note 79 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 80–82 and accompanying text.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 85–88.
18. Id.
19. Id.
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Against this accepted wisdom, however, multiple matching
programs make candidates more willing to engage more Americans and expand participation. For example, while candidates
in California (which lacks multiple matching funds) collect only
5% of their money from contributors who give $250 or less,20
candidates in New York City (the only American jurisdiction
with six-to-one multiple matching funds) collect over half of
their money from contributors who give $250 or less.21 Seven
times more New York City residents contributed to city races
(which have multiple matching funds) than contributed to state
races (which lack multiple matching funds).22 Data presented
for the first time here show that six-to-one multiple matching
funds stimulate participation much more effectively than a
basic one-to-one match23 and a handful of jurisdictions have
employed such multiple matching funds for decades.24
Nonetheless, critics will still argue that private markets
alone should finance politics.25 They are wrong. Providing the
basic framework for citizen participation through multiple
matching funds is a proper government function, as evidenced
by the other tools government uses to facilitate democratic participation. For example, the state traditionally provides a platform to participate by supplying voter registration services, accessible polling places, ballots, and other tools.26 Multiple
matching funds are no different. Indeed, multiple matching of
contributions is not “welfare for politicians” that boosts candidates with weak fundraising skills, as some have labeled conventional public financing. Instead, multiple matching funds
facilitate the majority’s maxim in Citizens United v. FEC that
money is a form of speech and therefore an important tool to
“hold officials accountable to the people.”27 Those who insist
that private money alone should finance politics elevate their
mechanical aversion to government over a commitment to expand liberty.

20. See infra note 42 ( listing states, including California, that provide
partial matching payments).
21. See infra note 109 and accompanying text.
22. See infra note 78 and accompanying text.
23. See discussion infra Part III.
24. See id.
25. See discussion infra Part II.B (discussing arguments from marketoriented critics against public financing of campaigns).
26. See infra text accompanying notes 96–99.
27. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 898 (2010).
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In facilitating participation, a multiple matching program
also diversifies a candidate’s support so that she is less beholden to a narrow group of large donors, thereby reducing the potential for corruption.28 Such a program would represent less
than 0.07% of government spending and would deliver a return
on investment several times higher by helping to prevent corruption in a political process that collects and spends trillions
of dollars each year.29
Multiple matching programs also avoid significant problems faced by traditional public financing, including funds being rejected by strong candidates and large subsidies being
wasted on candidates with little public support.30 Further, multiple matching programs do not burden speech, and they comply with the Court’s campaign finance decisions.31
This is a critical moment for campaign finance. Within two
terms, the Roberts Court struck down corporate spending restrictions and rendered traditional public financing schemes
obsolete.32 Citizens United also led to the emergence of independent expenditure-only committees that may accept unlimited contributions—or “superPACs”—which increased candidates’ incentives to find a few wealthy investors to fund these
outside groups with multimillion-dollar contributions.33 November 2012 will be the first general election in which presidential candidates from both major parties reject public financing since the inception of the program. If existing programs are
28. See infra text accompanying notes 118–21.
29. See infra text accompanying notes 137–51 (discussing cost-benefit
analyses of various matching programs).
30. See infra text accompanying notes 45–52.
31. See discussion infra Part III.C.
32. Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct.
2806, 2812 (2011) (invalidating the trigger provision of public financing); Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 929 (invalidating restrictions on corporate spending
on politics); see also Speechnow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686, 696 (D.C. Cir. 2010)
(holding that independent expenditure political committees could accept unlimited contributions from individuals, following the holding of Citizens United); FEC Advisory Op. 2010-11, available at http://saos.nictusa.com/saos/
searchao?SUBMIT=ao&AO=3069 (stating that unions and corporations could
give unlimited contributions to such independent expenditure committees).
33. See Speechnow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686, 696 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Memorandum from Thomasenia P. Duncan, General Counsel, FEC, et al. to the FEC
(July 21, 2010), available at http://www.fec.gov/agenda/2010/ mtgdoc1042.pdf.
Outside groups have spent $45,754,221 in the 2012 Republican primary race
compared to $43,423,823 from the candidates. See Outside Spending: 2012
Presidential Race, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, http://www.opensecrets.
org/races/indexp.php?cycle=2012&id=PRES ( last visited Feb. 12, 2012).
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not revamped soon, public financing may be off the public’s radar for decades, as budget deficits make antiquated public financing programs ripe targets for spending cuts. At the same
time, technology is removing barriers to participation—a
movement reflected by the rise of the small dollar donor. With
so much in flux, federal, state, and local lawmakers are looking
for guidance. This Article provides the direction that public financing should now take.
Part I of this Article chronicles the demise of public financing in the United States. Part II introduces a participatory theory to public financing, and explains why it is superior to the
approaches of both conventional public financing advocates who
seek to purge private money from politics and libertarians who
would rely exclusively on private economic markets. Part III details the implementation of this new approach by outlining and
analyzing a multiple match proposal for citizen contributions.
I. THE DEMISE OF CONVENTIONAL PUBLIC FINANCING
In public financing systems, candidates receive cash grants
for campaigning from the public treasury.34 Generally, candidates qualify for public funds by raising a threshold amount of
money from a minimum number of donors or by winning a party nomination.35 While all public funding systems require that
participating candidates limit their campaign spending,36 the
34. Candidates or parties may receive other forms of public subsidies,
such as the franking privilege, bulk mailing rates, rebates or tax credits to
contributors, political conventions grants, and television and radio subsidies.
See Richard Briffault, Public Funding and Democratic Elections, 148 U. PA. L.
REV. 563, 566–68 (1999) (discussing the forms of public subsidies available to
political candidates).
35. In “Clean Elections” states, candidates qualify for grants by raising a
threshold number of small private contributions and then agreeing to refrain
from additional private fundraising. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 16-946,
16-950 (2011) (requiring candidates to raise different numbers of $5 donations
to qualify for funding); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 9-702, 9-704 (2011) (requiring
candidates to raise $250,000 in contributions no greater than $100); ME. REV.
STAT. tit. 21, §§ 1122, 1125 (2011) (requiring different numbers of $5 donations depending on position sought); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-19A-2, 1-19A-4
(2011) (requiring $5 contributions from a percentage of the state population);
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 163-278.62, 163-278.64 (2011) (requiring 350 contributions, each between $10 and $500). Presidential primary candidates qualify for
public funds by raising $5000 from donors in at least twenty states. See 26
U.S.C. § 9033( b) (2006). In addition, only the first $250 of each contribution is
counted. See id.
36. See Briffault, supra note 34, at 568 (“All existing systems for providing
public funds to candidates require those who accept public funds to agree to
accept limits on their campaign spending.”); see also, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT.
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Court has interpreted the Constitution as forbidding such limits on candidates who choose not to participate.37
Jurisdictions allocate public funds in different ways.38 Full
flat-grant financing jurisdictions give candidates flat lump-sum
grants equal to those received by other participating candidates, and prohibit participating candidates from spending any
private money. Partial flat-grant financing jurisdictions often
give candidates flat lump-sum grants equal to the amounts given to other participating candidates, but allow them to collect
private money.39
Other jurisdictions match donor contributions. Most of these systems give candidates a modest match for private contributions in gubernatorial (and sometimes other statewide) elections. For example, in a jurisdiction that provides a one-to-one
match for the first $250 of a private contribution, a private
$250 contribution is worth $500 to a candidate. Two cities offer
significant multiple match programs. New York City, for example, matches the first $175 of a political contribution at a six-toone ratio (e.g., a $150 contribution is worth $1050 to a
candidate).40
ANN. §§ 16-941, 16-947 (2011); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 9-702 (2011); FLA. STAT.
§ 106.33 (2011); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 11-423, 11-428 (2011); ME. REV. STAT. tit.
21-A, § 1125(9) (2011); MD. CODE ANN., ELEC. LAW § 15-105 (2011); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ch. 55C,§ 1A (2011); MICH. COMP. LAWS§ 169.267 (2011); MINN.
STAT.§ 10A.25 (2010); NEB. REV. STAT. § 32-1604 (2011); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 19:44A-7 (West 2011); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1-19A-3 (2011); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 163-278.64 (2011); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 17-25-19 (2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit., 17
§ 2853 (2011); WIS. STAT. § 11.50 (2011).
37. Although spending limits applied to all candidates are unconstitutional, imposing spending limits on candidates as a condition of accepting public
funds is permissible. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 58–59, 107–08 (1976) ( per
curiam); see also R. SAM GARRETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33814, PUBLIC
FINANCING OF CONGRESSIONAL CAMPAIGNS: OVERVIEW AND ANALYSIS 4 (2011)
(“[P]ublic financing is attractive to some because it is one of the few constitutional ways to limit campaign spending . . . .”).
38. For a summary of state and local public financing laws, see JESSICA A.
LEVINSON & SMITH LONG, CTR. FOR GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES, MAPPING PUBLIC FINANCING IN AMERICAN ELECTIONS 5 (2009); JESSICA A. LEVINSON, CTR.
FOR GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES, STATE PUBLIC FINANCING CHARTS 2 (2009).
39. Partial public financing in Nebraska becomes available only if one
candidate adheres to spending limits while the other does not (the candidate
complying with limits is given public money). GARRETT, supra note 37, at 37.
This may violate the holding of Arizona Free Enterprise.
40. N.Y.C., N.Y. ADMIN. CODE §§ 3-703, 3-705 (2010). San Francisco offers
candidates a four-to-one match for the first $100,000 in contributions of up to
$500 to the candidate after the candidate qualifies for public matching funds.
S.F., CAL., CAMPAIGN & GOVERNMENTAL CONDUCT CODE §§ 1.104, 1.144
(2010). Members of Congress have recently introduced multiple matching for
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In 2011, five states provided full public financing,41 four
states provided partial public financing in the form of lump
sum payments,42 and seven states provided a modest match for

Congressional campaigns. See Fair Elections Now Act, H.R. 1826, 111th Cong.
(2009) ( providing a four-to-one match on contributions of $100 or less).
41. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-950 (2011); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 9-704
(2011); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 21, § 1125 (2011); N.M. STAT. ANN.§ 1-19A-4 (2011);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-278.64 (2011); LEVINSON & LONG, supra note 38, at 4
(indicating that the states of Arizona, Connecticut, Maine, New Mexico, and
North Carolina and the cities of Albuquerque and Portland provide full “clean
elections” public financing to qualified candidates running for some offices).
42. MINN. STAT.§ 10A.31 (20110); NEB. REV. STAT. § 32-1606 (2011) (mandating financing in set amounts for candidates for a variety of positions); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2855 (2011) (implementing block financing for governor
and lieutenant governor); WIS. STAT. § 11.50 (2011) (mandating funding split
between political positions, and then apportioned to each eligible candidate
running for that position); LEVINSON & LONG, supra note 37, at 5 (indicating
that the states of Florida, Hawaii, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Jersey, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Wisconsin; the
county of Miami-Dade; and the cities of Austin, Boulder, New Haven, New
York City, Tucson, and several California cities (Long Beach, Los Angeles,
Oakland, Richmond, Sacramento, and San Francisco) provide partial public
financing—in which Levinson and Long include matching funds—for some offices to candidates who qualify). Iowa, Ohio, and Utah do not offer public financing to candidates but offer it to parties (Rhode Island offers it to both parties and candidates). IOWA CODE § 68A.605 (2011); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3517.18 (LexisNexis 2011); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 44 -30-2 (2011); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 59-10-1312 (LexisNexis 2011). Arkansas, Oregon and Virginia do not
offer public financing to candidates or parties, but offer a tax credit to individuals who make political contributions (Arizona, Minnesota, Ohio, and Rhode
Island offer both tax credits and public financing grants to either parties or
candidates). ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-954 (2011) (allowing $5 tax credit for
donation directed to a specific party, or up to $500 tax credit for donation to
public funding of elections that cannot be directed); ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-6-222
(2011) (allowing up to a $50 credit for an individual return); MINN. STAT.
§ 290.06 (2011) (allowing a tax credit of up to $50 per individual for donation
to political party or candidate); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3517.18 (LexisNexis
2011) (offering tax credit of up to $50 for donation to candidate); OR. REV.
STAT. § 316.102 (2009) (same); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 44 -30-2 (2011) ( providing for
up to $5 tax credit per individual for donation to public financing, up to $2 of
which can be directed to a specific political party); VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-344.3
(2011) (allowing tax refund for up to a $25 contribution to a political party). In
all, twenty-two states currently offer some form of tax credit for political contributions and/or full or partial public financing to candidates and/or parties.
A majority of democracies throughout the world have “legal provisions” for
some form of public financing of campaigns. Magnus Öhman, Practical Solutions for the Public Funding of Political Parties and Election Campaigns, in
POLITICAL FINANCE REGULATION: THE GLOBAL EXPERIENCE 25, 60 (Magnus
Öhman & Hani Zainulbhai eds., 2009) (suggesting that over half of the 183
United Nations member states that have a “de jure multi-party system” have
“legal provisions” for public funding to political parties).
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private contributions.43 The federal government provided major
party presidential candidates full public financing for the general election and a modest one-to-one match on the first $250 of
a contribution for primary elections.44
Recently, stronger candidates have opted out of the presidential public financing system because of inadequate funding
and low spending limits imposed on participants. All winning
presidential candidates used the public financing system from
its inception in 1976 until 1996.45 In 2000 and 2004, however,
George W. Bush opted out of the primary public financing system.46 In 2008, Barack Obama opted out of both primary and
general election public financing.47 Had Obama accepted public
financing he would have received $105.8 million in public
funds48 and been limited to spending $126.15 million,49 whereas by opting out he was able to raise $745.7 million.50
Anticipating an opt-out problem in their state and local
elections, in the 1990s and early 2000s several states and localities adopted a “trigger” provision to entice candidates to accept

43. Seven states and the presidential primary fund utilize matching contributions. I.R.C.§ 9034 (2006); FLA. STAT. § 106.35(2) (2008) ( providing a twoto-one match for first $250); HAW. REV. STAT. § 11-429 (2011) ( providing a oneto-one match); MASS. GEN. LAWS, ch. 55C, §§ 1, 5 (2011) ( providing a one-toone match under $250); MD. CODE ANN., ELEC. LAW § 15-106 (2011) ( providing
a limited one-to-one match for gubernatorial candidates in the primary);
MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 169.212(1), 169.264(1) (2005) ( providing a two-to-one
match for contributions less than $100 in primary for participating gubernatorial candidates); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:44A-33 (West 2009) ( providing a two-toone match on the first $1500 for gubernatorial candidates); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 17-25-19 (2009) ( providing a two-to-one match for contributions less than
$500 and a one-to-one match for contributions above $500).
44. See I.R.C. §§ 9034(a), 9037 (2006) ( providing a one-to-one match on
first $250).
45. Eric M. Appleman, Democracy in Action, Presidential Campaign Finance, GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIV., http://www.gwu.edu/~action/2008/presfin08
.html ( last visited Aug. 29, 2011).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Presidential Spending Limits for 2008, FEC, http://www.fec.gov/pages/
brochures/pubfund_limits_2008.shtml ( last visited Aug. 25, 2011); Quick Answers to Public Funding Questions, FEC, http://www.fec.gov/ans/answers_
public_funding.shtml#howmuchmoneydotheyget ( last visited Aug. 26, 2011).
49. Presidential Spending Limits for 2008, supra note 48.
50. Jonathan D. Salant, Watergate-Era Public Finance System Faces
Budget Ax, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 26, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011
-01-26/watergate-era-finance-system-for-presidential-races-faces-house-budget
-ax.html.
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public money.51 These provisions increased spending limits and
gave additional public funds to a publicly financed candidate
when an opposing privately financed candidate and/or outside
group received or spent funds above a designated amount (often
the spending limit imposed upon the publicly financed
candidate).52
In Arizona Free Enterprise v. Bennett, a five-Justice majority invalidated Arizona’s trigger provision, concluding that it
violated the First Amendment.53 The Court determined that
the trigger burdened the speech of privately financed candidates and independent groups, as these entities knew that
spending over a set amount would trigger governmentsponsored speech opposing their interests.54 The Court found
that the drafters of the trigger intended to equalize speech between candidates, and determined that this rationale did not
constitute a compelling state interest that justified burdening
speech.55
Justice Elena Kagan, writing for the four dissenters, argued that the trigger was not a restriction designed to equalize
candidates, but a tool to efficiently allocate public funds to pre-

51. Deborah Goldberg, Public Funding of Judicial Elections: The Roles of
Judges and the Rules of Campaign Finance, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 95, 106 (2003).
52. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 16-952(A)-(B) (2011); FLA. STAT. § 106.355
(2011); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 21-A, § 1125(9) (2011); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1-19A-14
(2011); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-278.67 (2011); WIS. STAT. § 11.512 (2011). Cities
with trigger provisions that provide additional public funding include Albuquerque, Chapel Hill, Los Angeles, and New Haven. ALBUQUERQUE, N.M.,
CHARTER OF THE CITY OF ALBUQUERQUE, art. XVI, § 16 (2010); CHAPEL HILL,
N.C., GEN. CODE OF ORDINANCES§ 2-95(a)-( b) (2010); L.A., CAL., MUN.
CODE§ 49.7.22(C)-(D) (2011); NEW HAVEN, CONN., CODE OF GEN. ORDINANCES§ 2-825 (2011); see also Brief for Professors, supra note 3, at 7.
53. Chief Justice Roberts wrote the majority opinion joined by Justices
Alito, Kennedy, Thomas, and Scalia, and Justice Kagan wrote the dissent and
was joined by Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor. Ariz. Free Enter.
Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2812–13 (2011).
54. According to the majority, Arizona Free Enterprise was controlled by
Davis v. FEC, which invalidated a federal “Millionaire’s Amendment” provision that trebled the individual contribution limit for federal candidates whose
opponents spent more than $350,000 of their own money on their campaigns.
Ariz. Free Enter., 131 S. Ct. at 2818 (“The logic of Davis largely controls our
approach to this case.”) (citing Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 729 (2008)).
55. Ariz. Free Enter., 131 S. Ct. at 2825 (“[ W ]hen confronted with a choice
between fighting corruption and equalizing speech, the drafters of the [trigger]
provision chose the latter. . . . [The government has no] compelling state interest in ‘leveling the playing field’ . . . .”).
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vent corruption.56 Kagan recognized that the trigger simultaneously minimized waste in uncompetitive contests, and encouraged candidates to accept public financing by guaranteeing
the additional funds when privately financed opponents spent
more.57 To Kagan, the trigger made public financing workable,
and public financing prevented corruption because it supplanted the private cash that Kagan viewed as the source of political
corruption.58
The holding of Arizona Free Enterprise posed a thorny
problem for public financing supporters. To retain public financing’s traditional structure, public financing had to provide
more money to competitive candidates. At the same time, increased across-the-board funding to all candidates would likely
waste money on uncompetitive elections and on candidates who
have little popular support.
II. A PARTICIPATION THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCING
Rather than respond to Arizona Free Enterprise with stopgap provisions that lure candidates back to conventional public
financing, reformers should use the decision to transform the
public financing paradigm. Public financing should no longer
aim to purge all—or even most—private money from politics.
Instead, it should encourage as many citizens as possible to
participate in financing politics.59
Throughout the United States, relatively few people make
56. Id. at 2831–32 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (observing that the trigger allows states to motivate candidates to use public funding without resorting to
overly large lump payments).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 2830 (“By supplanting private cash in elections, public financing
eliminates the source of political corruption.”); id. at 2841 (“When private contributions fuel the political system, candidates may make corrupt bargains. . . . And voters, seeing the dependence of candidates on large contributors (or on bundlers of smaller contributions), may lose faith that their
representatives will serve the public’s interest. . . . Public financing addresses
these dangers by minimizing the importance of private donors . . . .”); see also
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 (1976) ( per curiam) (“It cannot be gainsaid
that public financing as a means of eliminating the improper influence of large
private contributions furthers a significant governmental interest.”).
59. See Spencer Overton, The Participation Interest, 100 GEO. L.J. 1259
(2012). While The Participation Interest introduces the state’s interest in facilitating financial participation in politics, this Article explains how conventional public financing undermined participation, why participation-based public
financing is a proper government expenditure, the attributes and costs of multiple matching of contributions, and how multiple matching represents the future of public financing after Arizona Free Enterprise. See id.
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political contributions. While 64% of eligible Americans voted
in the November 2008 election, only 10% typically give to political campaigns,60 and less than 0.5% are responsible for the
bulk of the money that politicians collect from individual contributors.61 Just as civic norms encourage all citizens to vote, a
key goal of public financing should be to encourage everyone to
make a financial contribution to a political candidate or a cause
of his or her choice. The bulk of campaign funds should come
from a broader cross section of the population, and public financing should facilitate widespread participation.
This Part explains how past public financing approaches
have suppressed participation. It then details why facilitating
citizen participation through public financing is a proper function of government.
A. PUBLIC FINANCING SHOULD PROVIDE INCENTIVES FOR
CITIZEN PARTICIPATION RATHER THAN SUPPRESS IT
Many advocates of traditional public financing programs
have vilified private money in politics and have assumed that
supplanting private money with public money would reduce
corruption, increase equality, and enhance political competition.62 Unfortunately, this conventional approach to public financing has often suppressed participation.
For example, in Arizona Free Enterprise Justice Kagan observed that “massive pools of private money” can corrupt our
60. See STEVEN J. ROSENSTONE & JOHN MARK HANSEN, MOBILIZATION,
PARTICIPATION, AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 41–42 (1993) [hereinafter
ROSENSTONE & HANSEN] (finding that between 1952 and 1990, in presidential
election years, only 10% of the voting age population contributed money to
parties or candidates); Stephen Ansolabehere et al., Why Is There So Little
Money in U.S. Politics?, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 105, 108 (2003) (finding that during the 2000 election, 10% of Americans over the age of eighteen gave to political candidates, party committees, or political organizations). Because small
contributions on the federal level and in many states and localities do not need
to be individually itemized and disclosed, the exact number of contributions is
unavailable but must be estimated through extrapolations of survey data.
61. In 2008, 0.44% of the adult population made a political contribution
worth $200 or more. See Ctr. for Responsive Politics, Donor Demographics,
OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/bigpicture/DonorDemographics
.php?cycle=2008 ( last visited Feb.12, 2012). At the state level, a fraction of one
percent of donors make contributions accounting for 80% of the money contributed. See E-mail from Edwin Bender, Exec. Dir., Nat’l Inst. on Money in
State Politics, to author (Mar. 7, 2011, 12:18 EST ) (on file with author).
62. See, e.g., Jay Mandle, The Need for Judicial Public Financing, DEMOCRACY MATTERS (Feb. 2008), www.democracymatters.org/index.php?option
=com_content&id=208.
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political system, and “[b]y supplanting private cash in elections, public financing eliminates the source of political corruption.”63 Using public grants to supplant private contributors,
however, suppresses expressive activity that poses no threat of
corruption, such as $25, $50, and $100 grassroots contributions.
To illustrate, Professor Richard Briffault—a leading public
financing scholar—has asserted that public financing advances
equality because “[m]oney from the public fisc comes from everyone and, thus, from no one in particular. . . . No one gains influence over the election through public funding.”64 Had Barack
Obama participated in the public financing program for the
2008 election, however, his campaign would not have been able
to collect even a $5 contribution from a donor and would not
have attracted an unprecedented 2.7 million small donors.65 In
attempting to advance equality by ensuring that money comes
from “no one in particular,” full public financing deadens citizen participation.
Briffault also argues that public financing is more likely to
promote competition because flat grants are “not tied to a candidate’s success in raising private donations” and “place candidates on an equal footing.”66 In trying to level the playing field
63. Ariz. Free Enter., 131 S. Ct. at 2830 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
64. Briffault, supra note 34, at 578. Many other reformers have pushed for
equality. See, e.g., Edward B. Foley, Equal-Dollars-Per-Voter: A Constitutional
Principle of Campaign Finance, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1204, 1215 (1994); Richard
L. Hasen, Clipping Coupons for Democracy: An Egalitarian/Public Choice Defense of Campaign Finance Vouchers, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 27–28 (1996); Jamin
Raskin & John Bonifaz, Equal Protection and the Wealth Primary, 11 YALE L.
& POL’Y REV. 273, 279 (1993); Daniel P. Tokaji, The Obliteration of Equality in
American Campaign Finance Law (And Why the Canadian Approach Is Superior) (Ohio St. Pub. Law Working Paper No. 140, Jan. 24, 2011).
65. Mark Schmitt, Can Money Be a Force For Good?, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT (December 12, 2008), http://prospect.org/article/can-money-be-forcegood. While “clean money” programs require that candidates collect a fixed
number of small contributions (e.g., ranging from $5 to $500) to qualify for
public funds, candidates who qualify are thereafter prohibited from mobilizing
even small donors. Indeed, the Campaign Finance Institute found that clean
money candidates often raise small qualifying contributions from their previous large-dollar supporters, rather than bringing new people into the process.
See Michael J. Malbin, Peter W. Brusoe & Brendan Glavin, Small Donors, Big
Democracy: New York City’s Matching Funds as a Model for the Nation and
States, 11 ELECTION L.J. 3, 19 (2012) (“Most [candidates] appear to have
raised their needed qualifying funds by staying within their old circles of
friends and supporters. As a result, the contributions did not bring many new
people into the system or more economic and racial diversity among donorparticipants, where were said to be among the goals.”).
66. Briffault, supra note 34, at 569–73. But see U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-390, CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM: EXPERIENCES OF TWO
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among candidates, however, traditional reformers assume erroneously that democracy should not give a competitive advantage to candidates who mobilize more people to participate
financially. Similarly, traditional reformers vilify “bundlers,”67
but they fail to emphasize that many fundraisers are volunteer
activists who mobilize participation of thousands of people in a
way that candidates alone could never accomplish.68
Private money is not always an evil that indebts politicians
to a few special interests—it can also be a democratic good that
allows citizens to hold politicians accountable. While traditional
reformers would supplant as much private money as possible to
eliminate the source of political corruption, the Court has recognized that money is an important tool to “hold officials accountable to the people.”69 Traditional reformers assume that
public financing is necessary to protect a candidate’s time from
fundraising,70 but the need for candidates to collect contributions can prompt them to engage with constituents and can facilitate accountability.
Traditional reformers are also wrong to attempt to purge
private money from politics because studies show that financial
participation is a gateway to other types of political participation. Small donors are more likely than non-donors and larger
donors to volunteer to ask others to vote for a candidate (e.g.,
by staffing a phone bank or canvassing), to put up a candidate’s
STATES THAT OFFERED FULL PUBLIC FUNDING FOR POLITICAL CANDIDATES
41–44 (2010) (showing that, after full public financing in Maine and Arizona,
the percentage of contested races increased only slightly, and incumbent
reelection rates remained roughly unchanged).
67. See, e.g., Ariz. Free Enter., 131 S. Ct. at 2829 (Kagan, J., dissenting)
(asserting that contribution limits are inadequate to prevent corruption because “[i]ndividuals who ‘bundle’ campaign contributions become indispensable to candidates in need of money”); Briffault, supra note 34, at 563 (stating
that law would have negative consequences by “providing a major role
for . . . bundlers”); Philip M. Nichols, The Perverse Effect of Campaign Contribution Limits: Reducing the Allowable Amounts Increases the Likelihood of
Corruption in the Federal Legislature, 48 AM. BUS. L.J. 77, 81 (2011) (suggesting
that bundlers “work for or against businesses” and “offer bribes to legislators”).
68. Private money itself is bad to some traditional reformers, and thus
these reformers fail to distinguish between an individual who makes a single
$100,000 soft money contribution and an activist who raises $100,000 by mobilizing 1000 people to give $100. As a matter of disclosure, the author served on
the Obama National Finance Committee for the 2008 and 2012 presidential
elections.
69. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 898 (2010). The five-Justice
majority in Arizona Free Enterprise is identical to the five-Justice majority in
Citizens United.
70. See infra notes 126–27 and accompanying text.
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campaign signs, or to distribute literature in a public place,
such as a county fair or election poll site.71
Interviews suggest that political operatives also see a relationship between giving and other forms of participation.72 As a
Campaign Finance Institute report states, “From the mobilizer’s perspective, the underlying logic of the gateway sequence
is a simple extension of the pervasive commercial sales practices of cross-selling and up-selling, in which a firm attempts to
persuade someone who has purchased one of its products to buy
another, perhaps more expensive of its product [sic].”73 Politicians and community organizers sometimes ask citizens for a
nominal financial contribution not as a primary source of campaign revenue, but as a step to help develop citizens’ investment in the campaign.74 Based on that relationship, the organizers then motivate citizens to engage in other ways, such as
volunteering.
B. FACILITATING PARTICIPATION IS A PROPER USE OF PUBLIC
RESOURCES
Public financing skeptics are wrong to assert that government has no role in political financing.

71. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. MALBIN ET AL., THE CFI SMALL DONOR PROJECT:
AN OVERVIEW OF THE PROJECT AND A PRELIMINARY REPORT ON STATE LEGISLATIVE CANDIDATES ’ PERSPECTIVES ON DONORS AND VOLUNTEERS 28 (2007),
available at http://www.cfinst.org/pdf/books-reports/CFI_Small-Donor_APSA
-paper_2007.pdf (noting the estimates of the proportion of various types of donors who helped campaign in ways beyond giving money); see also
ROSENSTONE & HANSEN, supra note 60, at 170–78 (“[P]eople who give also become the focus of other efforts to generate participation, for example, by discussing politics with neighbors, writing letters, and, most importantly, voting.”).
72. MALBIN ET AL., supra note 71, at 5–6 (showing how Ohio’s Delaware
County Republican Party converted $75 contributors into phone banking or
canvassing volunteers, and how national political strategist Karl Rove directed
campaign staff to keep records of small donors to ask them to volunteer).
73. Id. at 6. Money may serve as an important gateway to nonfinancial
participation because a small contribution may be a relatively easy way for
some Americans to participate initially, as suggested by data indicating that
many more people give money than time to politics. See sources cited supra
note 71.
74. MALBIN ET AL., supra note 71, at 6–7, n.7 (explaining how an Iowa citizens group used dues to get members vested and then mobilized the members
for rallies and meetings with government officials); see also SIDNEY VERBA ET
AL., VOICE AND EQUALITY: CIVIC VOLUNTEERISM IN AMERICAN POLITICS 367
(1995) (“[T]aking part in politics probably enhances political interest, efficacy,
and information; reciprocally, these political orientations surely have an impact on participation.”).
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Many skeptics of campaign finance reform argue not just
for freedom from government restrictions on campaign contributions and spending, but also for freedom from all government
involvement in campaign funding.75 A leading skeptic, Bradley
Smith, believes it is “dangerous to have the incumbent government directly involved in shaping the quantity and substance of
the very debate intended to determine how voters judge that
government’s performance on election day.”76
Granted, political debates will continue about the proper
role of government spending and tax incentives in such varied
areas as agriculture, housing, health care, military intervention abroad, and education,77 as well as how government allocates finite resources among these several areas. But providing
the basic platform for citizen participation in democracy
through properly crafted public financing is a worthwhile government function.
Anti-public financing advocates fail to grapple with the reality that the incomes of many citizens discourage politicians
from even reaching out to mobilize them and render these citizens less able to participate and hold politicians accountable. A
lack of income chokes off financial political participation more
than it hinders other forms of political participation.78 For ex-

75. See, e.g., WILLIAM R. MAURER & DOMINIC DRAYE, FEDERALIST SOC’Y
FOR LAW & PUB. POL’Y STUDIES, NEW FEDERAL INITIATIVES PROJECT: FAIR
ELECTIONS NOW ACT 3–4 (2010); CTR. FOR COMPETITIVE POLITICS, FAIRLY
FLAWED: ANALYSIS OF THE 2009 FAIR ELECTIONS NOW ACT 1, 28–30 (2009);

Richard M. Esenberg, The Lonely Death of Public Campaign Financing, 33
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 283, 287–89 (2010) (arguing that current public financing is “largely irrelevant” and that Davis v. FEC will put an end to most
new public financing attempts); Bradley A. Smith, Some Problems with Taxpayer-Funded Political Campaigns, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 594 –96 (1999)
[hereinafter Smith, Some Problems].
76. Bradley A. Smith, The Separation of Campaign and State, N.Y. TIMES,
June 27, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/06/27/the-court
-and-the-future-of-public-financing/the-courts-separation-of-campaign-and-state
[hereinafter Smith, The Separation]. Public financing skeptics also argue that
implicit in the U.S. Constitution is a “separation of campaign and state” principle that government should have no role in subsidizing campaigns. For a discussion of this argument, see infra notes 162–69 and accompanying text.
77. ABRAHAM LINCOLN, LIFE AND WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN: EARLY
SPEECHES, 1832–1856, at 215 (1907) (“The legitimate object of government is
to do for a community of people whatever they need to have done, but cannot
do at all, or cannot so well do, for themselves.”).
78. See VERBA ET AL., supra note 74, at 361 (discussing the importance of
income). See generally ROSENSTONE & HANSEN, supra note 60. While wealth
may also be a significant factor in the ability to make contributions, this Arti-
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ample, among those who are active in politics, people with little
income give nearly as much time volunteering in politics as
people with significant income—but income constraints determine who gives money.79 Of Americans living in families, individuals with families with incomes over $100,000 represented
15.6% of the voting-age population in 200480 and cast 19.2% of
the votes.81 Individuals with household incomes over $100,000
were also responsible for approximately 80% of political contributions over $200.82
Participation rates are also low due to collective action
problems in attracting smaller contributions from a broad
group of middle- and lower-income Americans.83 Candidates
face lower transaction costs in mobilizing larger contributions

cle focuses on income because most of the data available examines the correlation between income and political contributions.
79. VERBA ET AL., supra note 74, at 366 (“When it comes to making financial donations . . . the resource constraints of income are determinative even
among those who are active and engaged in politics.”); id. at 361 (“[P]olitical
interest has much less influence on contributions than on the other kinds of
acts. . . . In comparison to other activists, contributors are—all else being
equal—affluent but not especially engaged.”).
80. See KELLY HOLDER, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE,
VOTING AND REGISTRATION IN THE ELECTION OF NOVEMBER 2004, at 4, 10
(2006), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2006pubs/p20-556.pdf (noting
that the over-eighteen population of individuals in families with annual incomes over $100,000 was 24,025,000 and total population of individuals over
eighteen in families was 161,927,000).
81. See id. at 4, 10 (noting that 81.3% of individuals in families with incomes over $100,000 voted, compared to just 48.3% of individuals in families
with incomes less than $20,000).
82. See INST. FOR POLITICS, DEMOCRACY, & THE INTERNET, SMALL DONORS
AND ONLINE GIVING: A STUDY OF DONORS TO THE 2004 PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS12 (2006), http://www.cfinst.org/pdf/federal/president/IPDI_SmallDonors
.pdf (finding that 86% of the contributions over $200 in 2000 and 78% of such
contributions in 2004 came from individuals with a household income over
$100,000). Other studies have revealed similar findings. See VERBA ET AL., supra note 74, at 193 (utilizing data from a period in which federal contributions
were limited to $1000, and finding that “[t]he 3% of the sample with family
incomes over $125,000 are responsible for 4% of the votes, 8% of the hours devoted to campaigning, and fully 35% of the money contributed”); John M. de
Figueiredo & Elizabeth Garrett, Paying for Politics, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 591,
614 (2005) (citing AM. POLITICAL SCI. ASS’N TASK FORCE ON INEQUALITY &
AM. DEMOCRACY, AMERICAN DEMOCRACY IN AN AGE OF RISING INEQUALITY 7
(2004), available at http://www.apsanet.org/imgtest/taskforcereport.pdf ) (“Only 6% of people with incomes under $15,000 contribute to campaigns, contrasted to 56% of those with incomes over $75,000.”).
83. See ROSENSTONE & HANSEN, supra note 60, at 21–23 (explaining the
“paradox of participation”).
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from a narrow group of higher-income Americans.84 Studies
show that mobilization is a major factor in financial participation (people asked to give are much more likely to do so),85 and
fundraisers find that they can raise more money by targeting
personalized appeals to larger contributors. “Why should I call
ten people and ask for $100 each,” many candidates and fundraisers ask, “when it takes me less time to call one person and
ask for $1000?”86 While wholesale online solicitations are starting to displace expensive direct-mail solicitations and to lower
the transaction costs of raising money from smaller donors, data reveal that retail solicitation of large contributors continues
to dominate fundraising.87 In the 2008 election cycle, for example, candidates for the House of Representatives received almost four times more money from individuals who gave $1000 or
more than they did from contributors who gave $200 or less.88
Public financing critics also fail to address the fact that
market forces alone will not sufficiently expand participation in
the near future. Despite conventional wisdom about the emergence of the Internet as a better means for small donors to contribute, technology alone is unlikely to expand participation so
that candidates are more responsive and accountable to a significantly larger percentage of the population.89 Presidential
84. See id. at 30–33 (describing how strategies for targeted mobilization
drives candidates to contact wealthier Americans).
85. See ROSENSTONE & HANSEN, supra note 60, at 36–37 (observing that
“[t]he strategic choices of political leaders—their determinations of who and
when to mobilize—determine the shape of political participation in America”);
id. at 171 (finding that people who are contacted by a political party are almost twice as likely in presidential election cycles to contribute money than
those not contacted); VERBA ET AL., supra note 74, at 137–38 (comparing spontaneous political activity to that which is done in response to a request, and
finding that “[o]nly for contributors . . . is the proportion who acted spontaneously well under half ”); MALBIN ET AL., supra note 71, at 7 (discussing the correlation between citizens being asked to donate and donating to a campaign).
86. See infra note 110 and accompanying text.
87. See, e.g., Michael J. Malbin et al., The Need for an Integrated Vision of
Parties and Candidates: National Political Party Finances, 1999–2008, in THE
STATE OF THE PARTIES: THE CHANGING ROLE OF CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN
PARTIES 185, 198 (John C. Green & Daniel J. Coffey eds., 6th ed. 2011)
(demonstrating the discrepancy between aggregate donations from large contributions compared to small contributions in campaigns for the House of
Representatives).
88. See id. The ratio was substantially similar for the 2003–04 and 2005–
06 elections. See id.
89. See Malbin, Brusoe & Glavin, supra note 65, at 4 (noting that technology and the Internet has not, by itself, leveled the playing field between large
and small donors); ANGELA MIGALLY & SUSAN LISS, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUS-
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candidate Barack Obama, who had more contributors than any
American candidate in history and used technology in cuttingedge ways for his time, received 69.5 million votes in the 2008
general election but had around 3 million donors throughout
the entire primary and general election process (including an
estimated 2.5 million small donors).90 For more typical candidates running for less visible offices, the rate of financial participation is even lower.
Public financing skeptics may suggest that less wealthy
Americans participate by volunteering,91 but this discounts the
value of financial participation. While non-financial participation is critical, financial participation is easier for many—more
than five times as many people give only money to a candidate
as those who give only time.92 Many wealthier individuals have
limited time and may find it easier to participate through financial contributions, and democratic participation is broadened when less wealthy individuals enjoy a similar opportunity
to make a meaningful financial contribution.93 Financial participation is an important indicator of autonomy and selfgovernance, regardless of income.94
Identifying these challenges to participation and addressing them is a proper function of law. In the electoral context,
government regularly provides the basic framework and tools
TICE,

SMALL DONOR MATCHING FUNDS: THE NYC ELECTION EXPERIENCE 24
(2010) (“[T]echnology alone cannot unilaterally transform campaign fundraising.”). But see Richard L. Hasen, Political Equality, the Internet, and Campaign
Finance Regulation, 6 FORUM 1 (2008), available at http://electionlawblog
.org/archives/hasen-forum-final.pdf (“The effects of an expected deregulatory
move by the Supreme Court, however, are somewhat blunted by the rise of the
Internet, both as a means for the exchange of political information and for
small-donor fundraising.”).
90. See Schmitt note 65; see also FED. ELECTION COMM’N, 2008 PRESIDENTIAL POPULAR VOTE SUMMARY FOR ALL CANDIDATES LISTED ON AT LEAST ONE
STATE BALLOT 5, http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2008/tables2008.pdf.
91. See MAURER & DRAYE, supra note 75, at 13 (observing that “there are
other ways citizens can have influence in the political process besides contributing financially. Volunteers are a key component of almost every campaign.”).
92. VERBA ET AL., supra note 74, at 67 (indicating that of individuals who
participate in politics, 69% limit their involvement to giving money, 19% give
both time and money, and 12% give time but not money).
93. Professor Bradley Smith, who opposes campaign finance reform generally, has asserted that political contributions are democratizing because
they give people who lack political skills an opportunity to influence politics.
Bradley A. Smith, Money Talks: Speech, Corruption, Equality, and Campaign
Finance, 86 GEO. L.J. 45, 94 (1997).
94. See id. at 48–55 (arguing that campaign donations are a form of free
speech).
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for participation.95 In the past, private parties provided ballots,
private parties financed and regulated party primary election
contests, and citizens who voted paid directly for the election
infrastructure through their poll taxes.96 More recently, however, the state has provided a platform to facilitate participation
by designing and providing ballots, funding and conducting the
party primary election process, funding elections from the general treasury rather than taxing voters, and offering other avenues of participation such as voter registration services at Department of Motor Vehicle offices.97 Public financing that
facilitates participation is a part of this evolution.
In Buckley v. Valeo, the Court upheld a public financing
program that matched donations so that a $250 contribution
would be worth $500 to presidential primary candidates.98
While this one-to-one match was not as effective as the multiple match proposed below, the Court noted the program furthered pertinent First Amendment values because it was “a
congressional effort, not to abridge, restrict, or censor speech,
but rather to use public money to facilitate and enlarge public
discussion and participation in the electoral process, goals vital
to a self-governing people.”99
Ronald Reagan—who criticized unnecessary government
spending—not only accepted matching funds for contributions
but benefitted more than any other candidate.100 Reagan mobilized thousands of contributors and remains the “only candi-

95. Benjamin D. Black, Note, Developments in the State Regulation of Major and Minor Political Parties, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 109, 109–12 (1996)
( providing an overview of ways legislatures and courts control political parties’
frameworks).
96. Briffault, supra note 34, at 583 (“[I]t is just as appropriate to use tax
dollars to cover the costs of an election campaign as it is to use tax dollars to
pay for preparing and producing ballots and collecting and tabulating the results.”); cf. Black, supra note 95, at 116.
97. See, e.g., National Voter Registration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 1973(gg)
(2006).
98. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 85–86, 89–90, 107–08 (1976) ( per
curiam).
99. Id. at 92–93; see also id. at 93 n.127 (“Legislation to enhance these First Amendment values is the rule, not the exception. Our statute books
are replete with laws providing financial assistance to the exercise of free
speech . . . .” (emphasis added)).
100. See Brief for Amici Curiae Anthony Corrado et al. in Support of Respondents at 16–17, Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom PAC v. Bennett, 131 S.
Ct. 2806 (2011) (Nos. 10-238, 10-239), 2011 WL 661708.
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date to ever reach the public funding primary campaign
maximum.”101
While government should not compel financial participation or equalize all citizen giving,102 policymakers should recognize that lack of income causes people not to participate, and
should use the law to facilitate participation.
III. MULTIPLE MATCHING OF POLITICAL
CONTRIBUTIONS
Federal, state, and local lawmakers should adopt multiple
matching fund programs that match the money a contributor
gives to a candidate. The program should match the first $200
of a political contribution at a six-to-one ratio,103 so that a $100
contribution would be worth $700 to a candidate. Multiple
matching funds would increase citizen participation,104 prevent
corruption, make candidates more accountable to voters, and
attract competitive candidates to public funding.105 Multiple
matching funds are also cost-effective and constitutional.106
A. MULTIPLE MATCHING FUNDS INCREASE PARTICIPATION
Multiple matching programs increase participation, as
demonstrated by the New York City program that matches the
first $175 of a political contribution at a six-to-one ratio. In
2009, the typical New York City Council candidate who participated in the multiple match program had twice as many contributors and three times as many small contributors as the
typical nonparticipating candidate.107 Seven times more New
York City residents contributed to city candidates (the city had
the multiple matching program) than contributed to state can-

101. Id. (“But no candidate benefitted from public funding more than
Ronald Reagan. . . . President Reagan remains the only candidate to ever
reach the public funding primary campaign maximum.”).
102. See Overton, supra note 59, at 1282–88 (distinguishing equality from
participation).
103. This $200 level is proposed in 2011 dollars, and it should be indexed to
inflation.
104. See infra Part III.A.
105. See infra Part III.B.
106. See infra Part III.C.
107. MIGALLY & LISS, supra note 89, at 15. In 2009, matching fund participants included 93% of primary candidates, 66% of general election candidates,
and 95% of those elected to city office (all but Mayor Bloomberg and two of the
fifty-one City Council members participated). See id. at 10.
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didates (the state lacked a matching program).108 Money attributable to donors who gave $250 or less made up 65% of the
money of City Council candidates who participated in the
matching program (including public money), but only 17% of
nonparticipating New York City Council candidates’ money,
and only 7% of New York State candidates’ money.109
Interviews with New York City candidates suggest that the
matching program increased candidates’ incentives to reach out
to more people. Former City Councilmember David Yassky explained the calculus from the perspective of a candidate:
[ W ]ithout the multiple match, a $175 contribution is of marginal value to a campaign because it is simply too time intensive to seek out
small donors. For example, I could make one phone call and ask for a
$2,000 check, or I could make twenty calls to solicit $100 donations.
The six-to-one multiple match turns $100 into $700, making it worth
it to pursue small donors. Because there is no public financing system
in place at the federal level, federal candidates are much less interested in $100 checks than are candidates in New York City
elections.110

Candidates also suggested that multiple matches increased
contributors’ incentives to donate. Public Advocate Bill de
Blasio explained:
Even people who were not very interested in politics were energized
by the possibility that they could play such a role in the campaign be108. See Malbin, Brusoe & Glavin, supra note 65, at 12 tbl.4 (noting that
0.22% of the New York City voting age population contributed to state elections in 2006, compared to 1.75% of the New York City voting age population
contributing to city campaigns in 2009). This data refers to the 2006 New York
State election, the last statewide election with comparable data, and the 2009
New York City elections, the last city election with comparable data. See id.
Five times more New York City residents contributed to candidates in the
2005 city election than the 2006 state election (the city’s 2005 four-to-one
match was less lucrative than its 2009 six-to-one ratio). Id. at 12–13. New
York City has ninety-seven state officials that represent the city (including the
Governor, Lt. Governor, Comptroller, and Attorney General (all statewide),
and twenty-eight state senators and sixty-five state legislators with all or
parts of their districts in the city), and fifty-nine city officials who represent
the city (including Mayor, the Public Advocate, the Comptroller, five Borough
Presidents, and fifty-one City Council candidates). See Elected Officials,
NYC.GOV, http://www.nyc.gov/portal/site/nycgov/menuitem.36b1636466ec9207a
62fa24601c789a0/index.jsp?cf01pg=1&cf01sz=10 ( last visited Aug. 21, 2011);
Who Are Your Elected Officials?, N.Y. STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS, http://
nymap.elections.state.ny.us/nysboe/ ( last visited Aug. 21, 2011).
109. Malbin, Brusoe & Glavin, supra note 65, at 8 tbl.1. Among participating candidates, individual contributors under $250 accounted for more private
money (37%) than contributors over $1000 (31%). Id. at 7 tbl.2.
110. MIGALLY & LISS, supra note 89, at 14 (citing interview by Angela
Migally with David Yassky, Comm’r/Chair, N.Y.C. Taxi and Limousine Commission, in N.Y.C., N.Y. (June 25, 2010)).
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cause of the effect the multiplier had on their smaller contribution.
When people who didn’t understand that there was a six-to-one match
learned about the match, it was huge for them. Someone who would
never have given $175 to a campaign would do it with the match. It
empowered them by empowering their money.111

The six-to-one multiple matching funds program stimulates participation much more effectively than more modest
one-to-one or two-to-one matches, perhaps because the more
modest programs give candidates insufficient incentives to mobilize smaller contributors.112 In New York City, for example,
participation increased as lawmakers revised the program from
a one-to-one match on the first $1000 contributed (in the 1989,
1993, and 1997 elections), to a four-to-one match on the first
$250 (in the 2001 and 2005 elections), and eventually to a sixto-one match on the first $175 (in the 2009 election).113 According to the New York City Campaign Finance Board, the shift
from the one-to-one ratio to the six-to-one ratio increased the
111. Id. at 12 (citing Telephone Interview by Elizabeth Daniel with Bill de
Blasio, Public Advocate, in N.Y.C., N.Y. (May 18, 2010)).
112. Of existing matching fund systems, New York City’s program is likely
the most successful because it provides “the largest matching ratio [six-to-one]
on the lowest matchable amount [$175].” Id. at 4. These more modest matches
may have also failed because they were limited to a few statewide elections
like governor’s races. Thus, the programs did not spark an across-the-board
culture of incentives for citizen participation in all state-level races. Furthermore, these statewide candidates possibly had less use for grassroots campaigning than local or legislative candidates because their electorates were so
large. In addition, in some jurisdictions (e.g., Maryland), spending limits on
participating candidates were set at such low rates that few candidates participated. GARRETT, supra note 37, at 36–44.
113. In 1997, contributions of $250 or less accounted for 54,456 total donations, comprising $4,228,040 and, with public funding, made up 30.8% of participating candidates’ funds. E-mail from Ilona Kramer, N.Y.C. Campaign Fin.
Bd., to author (Aug. 12, 2011, 09:33 EST ) (on file with author). In 2001, there
were 107,281 such donations for $11,241,506 and, with public financing, 55.1%
of participating candidates’ funds. Id. In 2005, the number of such donations
fell to 66,110, amounting to $7,180,067 and, with public financing, 49.7% of
participating candidates’ funds. Id. In 2009, participation grew again with
76,397 such donations for $6,806,183 or, with public financing, 54.4% of participating candidates’ available funds. Id. Another examination of the data shows
a slightly different but similar trend, with contributors of $250 or less ( private
and public money) accounting for 39% of participating candidate money in
1997, 68% in 2001, 58% in 2003, 54% in 2005, and 64% in 2009. Malbin,
Brusoe, & Glavin, supra note 65, at 8. The year 2001 was an outlier according
to a New York City Campaign Finance Board official because it “was the first
election with term limits and the increased matching rate. There were an unprecedented number of open seats . . . and new candidates felt the ability to
run without the incumbency factor and with the increased benefits of the
matching funds program.” E-mail from Ilona Kramer, N.Y.C. Campaign Fin.
Bd., to author (Aug. 12, 2011, 12:00 EST ) (on file with author).
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percentage of private money candidates received from small contributors 33% percent, and increased the percentage of private
and public funds attributable to small contributors by 76%.114
The shift in ratio to six-to-one increased the yield on a $175
contribution and lowered the cost of raising money from smaller contributors. With a one-to-one match, raising a $175 contribution (worth $350) was still much more expensive than raising
a $1000 contribution (which also increased in value due to the
match),115 because the yield on the $175 was not sufficiently
high compared with the relatively fixed transaction costs associated with all contributors (e.g., campaign resources required
to identify, solicit, engage/entertain, and thank all contributors,
and the administrative and legal compliance costs of each donation). The six-to-one match, however, changed candidate behavior because it sufficiently increased the value of $175 contributions (now worth $1225). Other relevant factors included
the efficiencies candidates realized in being able to merge their
fundraising operations and constituency outreach,116 and the
relatively broad pool of people who could afford to give $175
(which was much larger than the pool of potential $1000
contributors).117
B. OTHER POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
In addition to facilitating participation, multiple matching
funds possess other attractive characteristics.
Multiple matching funds reduce the potential for corruption. Consistent with Justice Kagan’s assumptions that private
114. The shift from the one-to-one to six-to-one match increased the percentage of private money candidates received from contributors of $250 or less
from 14.4% up to 19.2%, and increased the percentage of private and public
funds attributable to this group from 30.8% to 54.4%. E-mail from Ilona Kramer, N.Y.C. Campaign Fin. Bd., to author (Aug. 12, 2011, 09:33 EST ) (on file
with author).
115. The one-to-one match on the first $1000 increased politicians’ incentives to pursue larger contributors and ignore smaller contributors by doubling
the disparity between a $175 contributor (worth $350) and a $1000 contributor
(worth $2000). The six-to-one match on the first $175, however, does not increase the raw dollar difference between the $175 contributor (worth $1225)
and the $1000 contributor (worth $2050). The six-to-one ratio, however, does
increase disparities between $175 contributors and those who contribute less.
While this issue is inevitable with multiple matching funds, it is best addressed by adopting a high multiplier and a low matched amount.
116. See infra notes 127–28 and accompanying text.
117. These factors made it easier for many candidates to pursue two $175
contributors (worth $2450 with multiple matching funds) than a single $1000
contributor (worth $2050 with multiple matching funds).
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money from large contributors and “bundlers” is suspect,118
some conventional reformers might argue that the multiple
match facilitates corruption by allowing bundlers and specialinterest groups to funnel matched contributions to favored politicians to influence the process.119 This reformer vision of democracy runs counter, however, to the Court’s observation in
Citizens United that private money is an important tool to
“hold officials accountable to the people.”120 Reformers should
not aim to purge organization and mobilization from politics,121
as these are key elements of participation. Multiple matching
programs reduce the likelihood of a more commonly accepted
definition of improper behavior—quid pro corruption—by diversifying a candidate’s support so that she is less beholden to
a narrow group of large donors.
In addition to helping to prevent corruption, multiple
matching funds are more flexible and efficient than flat-grant
programs. In rigidly distributing equal grants to different candidates in varied political races, flat-grant programs face the
“Goldilocks Dilemma.”122 Generous flat-grant programs, for example, often waste public funds on candidates who obtain little
benefit from increased spending (e.g., unpopular candidates
with no chance of winning, popular candidates with no chance
of losing, and candidates in competitive but less expensive races). Frugal flat-grant programs with more stringent qualification requirements may exclude promising new candidates, and
frugal programs that give inadequate grants prompt stronger
candidates to opt out of public financing.123
118. See supra note 58.
119. Jamin Raskin & John Bonifaz, The Constitutional Imperative and
Practical Superiority of Democratically Financed Elections, 94 COLUM. L. REV.
1160, 1171–72 (1994) (observing that in a privately financed system without
income disparities, “the most anti-social and self-seeking factions could gain
an advantage in government and use their power to win sweetheart contracts,
tax breaks, and other government subsidies”).
120. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 898, 910 (2010).
121. Mark Schmitt, Mismatching Funds: How Small-Donor Democracy Can
Save Campaign Finance Reform, DEMOCRACY: A J. OF IDEAS, Spring 2007, at 8,
15, available at http://www.democracyjournal.org/pdf/4/008-020.schmitt.FINAL
.pdf (“The campaign reform movement should first stop fighting organization
itself.”).
122. Cf. Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct
2806, 2832 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“The difficulty, then, is in finding the Goldilocks solution—not too large, not too small, but just right.”).
123. Malbin, Brusoe & Glavin, supra note 65, at 20 (“If the threshold is set
too low, public money will be wasted. If too high, the threshold will effectively
become a barrier, defeating the goal of bringing new and potentially viable
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Multiple matching fund programs largely avoid the Goldilocks Dilemma. The qualification threshold can be low to allow
upstart candidates to participate, but candidates who do not attract a significant following generally will not attract enough
contributions that must be matched to drain the public treasury.124 Further, because the spending limit is not tied to the
public money allocated (as it is with full public financing), multiple matching programs that give each candidate a relatively
modest total amount of matching money can attract candidates
by relaxing or abolishing candidate spending limits.125
Multiple matching programs also allow candidates to
merge their fundraising operations and constituency outreach.
Conventional reformers assert that traditional large-dollar
fundraising hampers representation because it requires that
candidates spend too much time away from their voting constituents.126 Multiple matching funds encourage candidates to
raise a greater portion of their money from their constituents,
candidates into the system.”). A fixed program that gives an identical flat
grant of $100,000 to all candidates running for state legislature, for example,
can be both too generous for races in some districts and waste public money,
and too frugal for others. Some have proposed addressing this problem by distributing public funds to political parties, and giving parties the discretion to
allocate more public funds to their candidates in particular districts. See, e.g.,
Daniel Hays Lowenstein, On Campaign Finance Reform: The Root of All Evil
Is Deeply Rooted, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 301, 351–54 (1989) (discussing a party
allocation system of public financing). While this proposal eliminates waste, it
does not facilitate citizen participation or work in party primaries.
124. Malbin, Brusoe & Glavin, supra note 65, at 20 (explaining that with
matching funds “the qualification threshold can be set fairly
low. . . . Candidates who do not develop significant constituencies are not likely to get enough in matching funds to raise a fiscal concern anyway”).
125. Multiple matching programs could relax spending limits in one of several ways: (1) set a relatively high spending limit tied to inflation; (2) exempt
from spending limits all expenditures that derive from contributions of $200 or
less; (3) exempt from spending limits publicly financed candidates when they
are outspent by privately financed opponents (some interpretations of Arizona
Free Enterprise may prohibit this); or (4) abolishing all spending limits for
publicly financed candidates. For further discussion, see Spencer Overton,
Ending Spending Limits in Public Financing for Campaigns (Sept. 29, 2011)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
126. See Vincent Blasi, Free Speech and the Widening Gyre of FundRaising: Why Campaign Spending Limits May Not Violate the First Amendment After All, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1281, 1281 (1994) (asserting that the need
to preserve the time of elected representatives for legislative duties justifies
campaign finance reform); Briffault, supra note 34, at 583 (“Public funding can
reduce the time and effort that all but independently wealthy candidates must
currently devote to fundraising, thus enabling candidates to focus more on the
voters and less on donors.”); Raskin & Bonifaz, supra note 119, at 1188 (“Time
on the money trail is . . . time spent away from one’s voting constituents.”).
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especially when such programs match only those contributions
from residents of the candidate’s locality or state.127 These programs increase campaign efficiencies by allowing candidates to
invest fewer resources in large-dollar fundraising operations,
and by facilitating the conversion of networks of small donors
into networks of community organizers.128 As four-term Bronx
Borough President Fernando Ferrer stated:
Because the match makes it effective for me to raise money in all
communities, my fundraising activities do not diverge as much from
my actual campaign as they would without the match. I am in contact
with many of the same people, regular voters, both for regular campaign purposes and fundraising purposes.129

Proponents of traditional flat grants might assert that
multiple matching funds favor incumbents, celebrities, and
candidates tied to membership organizations such as unions
and the NRA, and disadvantage political newcomers.
Public financing should not be an equal-employment opportunity plan for candidates, but should increase citizen participation. By focusing on citizens, multiple matching funds encourage candidates to mobilize a core group of supporters, raise
funds from that group, and then use those resources to mobilize
a broader group of supporters. Multiple matching funds reward
candidates who are popular not simply among the affluent elite
(who fund the bulk of our current campaigns), but also among a
much larger population of citizens.
Another complaint is that multiple matching funds amplify
only the voices of those who have the resources to give,130 and
that a voucher system would better minimize the impact of dis127. For example, in New York City eligibility for public financing for borough presidents and city council members requires candidates for those offices
to raise a certain number of matchable contributions from “residents of the
borough,” and from residents “of the district in which the seat is to be filled,”
respectively. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 3-703(2)(a) (2011). Once a candidate for
these offices has met the eligibility requirement, the law restricts matchable
contributions to contributions “made by a natural person resident in the city of
New York.” N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 3-702(3) (2011).
128. MIGALLY & LISS, supra note 89, at 18 (indicating that “[u]nder the
NYC [multiple matching] system, candidates are incentivized to build networks of small donors who become networks of organizers. The most costeffective fundraising and the most persuasive organizing takes place at the
same spot: in supporters’ living rooms”).
129. Id. (citing Affidavit of Bronx Borough President Fernando Ferrer ¶ 4,
City of New York v. N.Y. City C.F.B., No. 400550/01, (Feb. 12, 2001)).
130. Raskin & Bonifaz, supra note 64, at 332 (asserting that one-to-one
matching funds on the first $200 use public money “to reinforce and to amplify
the voice of those already wealthy enough to give” and “lock into place a fundamentally flawed regime in which private wealth continues to dominate”).
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parities in income.131 One leading voucher program, for example, would give each American $50 in “Patriot Dollars” to donate to their favored candidates who participate in the program
and agree not to accept other forms of private financing.132
Although multiple matching funds will not overcome all
barriers to participation, they advance different values and enjoy advantages over vouchers. Vouchers promote mathematical
equality, while multiple matching funds facilitate meaningful
participation. By disqualifying candidates who accept and
spend private money, vouchers are less likely to be used by
candidates than multiple matching funds. Unlike vouchers,
multiple matching programs allow donors to express the intensity of their preferences by contributing more money. Multiple
matching funds also make it easier for citizens to give contributions to multiple candidates, which is particularly helpful to
less-visible, down-ballot candidates.
Skeptics might also assert that ideological extremists on
the far left and the right currently give the bulk of small contributions, and multiple matching funds would enhance their
polarizing influence on politics.133 Conservative Congresswoman Michele Bachmann, for example, raised 73% of her funds in
2010 from small donors (more than any other member of Congress).134 Multiple match programs that limit the match to contributions from residents of a candidate’s locality or state would
not accelerate polarization,135 however, as the bulk of ideologically charged contributions come from out-of-district residents
(e.g., Bachmann’s 2010 congressional campaign raised 69% of
its money from outside of Bachmann’s state136).
131. See BRUCE ACKERMAN & IAN AYRES, VOTING WITH DOLLARS: A NEW
PARADIGM FOR CAMPAIGN FINANCE 43 (2002) (rejecting matching fund systems because Americans “should not be required to sacrifice private goods” to
support candidates financially); see also Foley, supra note 64, at 1220–26
( promoting vouchers); Hasen, supra note 64, at 18–27 ( promoting a voucher
program).
132. See Bruce Ackerman & Ian Ayres, ‘Patriot Dollars’ Put Money Where
the Votes Are, L.A. TIMES, July 17, 2003, at B15.
133. Cf. Smith, Some Problems, supra note 75, at 601 (observing that “a
number of fringe candidates have qualified for federal matching funds”).
134. Michele Bachmann, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/
politicians/summary.php?cid=N00027493#funds ( last visited Jan. 31, 2011).
135. For a discussion of New York City’s restrictions regarding in-district
and city residents, see supra note 127 and accompanying text.
136. It is not possible to trace the origins of very small contributions as
candidates are not required to include the addresses of contributors who give
less than $200 in their reports to the FEC. 2 U.S.C. § 434( b)(3) (2006 & Supp.
2010); see also, e.g., Michele Bachmann: Campaign Finance/Money—
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The cost of a multiple matching program is also reasonable. In the 2009 election, the New York City matching program
cost $27 million,137 or about $3.22 per resident once every four
years.138 On an average annual basis, this represented
0.00011% of New York City’s budget.139 New York City spends
more on the Taxi and Limousine Commission,140 temporary
services,141 and printing142 than it does on the multiple match
program.143
For a relatively insignificant cost, multiple matching funds
facilitate widespread participation and engagement in a political process that affects almost all citizens by determining the
allocation of trillions of dollars in tax revenues and government
expenditures. In the United States, the federal government
alone collected an average of $7005.77 per resident in revenue,144 and expended on average $2639.71 per resident on deGeography Data, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/politicians/
geog.php?cid=N00027493&cycle=2010 ( last visited Jan. 31, 2012) (noting that
the calculation of in-state and out-of-state contributions includes only those
contributions of more than $200). Even without the in-state provision, multiple matching funds would not likely polarize politics. Without a match, ideology motivates many small donors. Thus, the multiple match would likely
prompt participation by a larger group of less ideological citizens.
137. N.Y.C. CAMPAIGN FIN. BD., NEW YORKERS MAKE THEIR VOICES
HEARD 5 (2010), available at http://www.nyccfb.info/PDF/per/2009_PER/2009
PostElectionReport.pdf. The 2005 election cost about $24 million. See N.Y.C.
CAMPAIGN FIN. BD., PUBLIC DOLLARS FOR THE PUBLIC GOOD 74 (2006), available at http://www.nyccfb.info/PDF/per/2005_PER/2005_Post_Election_Report.pdf.
138. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, NEW YORK CITY, NEW YORK: ACS DEMOGRAPHIC AND HOUSING ESTIMATES1 (2009), available at http://www.nyc.gov/
html/dcp/pdf/census/nyc_boro_demo_06to09_acs.pdf (finding 8,391,881 N.Y.C.
residents).
139. New York City’s Net Total Expense Budget for Fiscal Year 2010 in the
City’s Adopted Budget was $59,479,863,786. CITY OF NEW YORK, ADOPTED
BUDGET FISCAL YEAR 2010 i (2009), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/omb/
downloads/pdf/erc6_09.pdf.
140. Id. at 148E.
141. Id. at 5C (using as an example temporary secretarial services).
142. Id. at 4C.
143. Some may be concerned that multiple matching funds program require the creation of additional bureaucracy. While the Federal Election
Commission has experience with a modest presidential primary matching
fund program, many localities and states would need to establish a regulatory
structure to administer matching funds.
144. In 2010, the government had receipts of $2163 billion. OFFICE OF
MGMT. & BUDGET, FISCAL YEAR 2012 BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT 171
(2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/
fy2012/assets/budget.pdf. In 2010, the United States had an official population
count of 308,745,538. U.S. Census Bureau Announces 2010 Census Population
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fense,145 $2270.48 on Social Security,146 $2328.78 on Medicare
and Medicaid,147 $1590.31 on non-defense discretionary spending (i.e., other executive branch and independent agencies),148
and $634.83 on interest on the public debt.149 An annual expenditure of $4.88 per person for multiple matching funds150 is
a modest cost to ensure adequate input from—and accountability to—a broad and diverse group of Americans, as well as to
help prevent corruption and the appearance of corruption in
the allocation of these resources.151
Counts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Dec. 21, 2010), http://2010.census.gov/news/
releases/operations/cb10-cn93.html.
145. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 144, at 174 (showing expenditures on discretionary security programs of $815 billion).
146. See id. (showing expenditures on Social Security of $701 billion).
147. See id. (showing expenditures on Medicare of $446 billion and Medicaid of $273 billion).
148. See id. (showing expenditures on discretionary non-security programs
of $491 billion).
149. See id. (showing expenditures on interest of $196 billion).
150. This figure errs on the high side of possible costs, if Congress were to
allocate enough funds to fully fund every federal election (including midterm
elections) at the level of a presidential election, and not just provide a match.
If Congress were to allocate $3.008 billion for the multiple match—the entire
amount spent by candidates for federal office in the 2008 elections—then the
annual cost per United States resident would be $4.88. See 2008 PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN FINANCIAL ACTIVITY SUMMARIZED: RECEIPTS NEARLY DOUBLE
2004 TOTAL, FEC (June 8, 2009), http://www.fec.gov/press/press2009/
20090608PresStat.shtml (noting $84.1 million in public funds and $46.4 million in private funds for John McCain’s legal and accounting expenses for general election); Congressional Candidates Raised $1.42 Billion in 2007–08, FEC
(Dec. 29, 2009), http://www.fec.gov/press/press2009/2009Dec29Cong/2009
Dec29Cong.shtml (showing $1.38 billion in expenditures for House and Senate
races in 2008 election); PRESIDENTIAL PRE-NOMINATION CAMPAIGN DISBURSEMENTS DECEMBER 31, 2008, FEC (Dec. 31, 2008), http://www.fec.gov/
press/press2009/20090608Pres/3_2008PresPrimaryCmpgnDis.pdf
(showing
$1,497,977,843 in expenditures, including activity for Ralph Nader, Democratic and Republican primary candidates, and both primary and general election
funds for President Obama); U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 144 (finding
that the population of U.S. is 308,745,538).
151. Some suggest that contributions do not shape budgetary priorities. See
MAURER & DRAYE, supra note 75, at 15 (asserting no connection exists between campaign contributions and political favors, that public financing will
not reduce government spending, and suggesting that public financing may
facilitate earmarks and pork barrel spending by elected officials who prioritize
their constituents’ parochial interests over national interests). Others disagree,
and assert that firms profit from contributions. See AM. FOR CAMPAIGN REFORM,
MONEY IN POLITICS & GOVERNMENT WASTE (2010), available at http://www
.acrreform.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/Fact-Sheet-Earmarks-Money-in-Politics1
.pdf (observing that in 2008, the top ten recipients of defense industry earmarks each received an average of $13 in federal funds for every $1 they spent
on contributions and lobbying expenditures). While demonstrating that cam-
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Multiple matching funds are also less expensive than conventional full public financing. Unlike full public financing
grants that supplant private money, multiple matching jurisdictions provide only a portion of what is needed to run an election, and this amount can be lowered if needed.152 For example,
assuming it costs $100,000 to run a typical city council race, a
jurisdiction could agree to give six-to-one matching funds on
the first $200 of each contribution up to $25,000, $50,000, or
$75,000 for each race.153 While the $75,000 level will likely ensure the greatest participation, the $25,000 level will also
stimulate significant participation.
Finally, sufficient protections exist to prevent the fraudulent use of multiple matching funds. Critics might argue that a
candidate could give $100 checks to 500 different people, have
each of those people contribute $100 to the candidate’s campaign, and receive a six-to-one match on the money collected—
turning $50,000 into $350,000.154 This type of fraud could be
prosecuted under existing federal, state, and local anti-conduit
laws that prohibit individuals from providing funds to others
for the purpose of making a contribution.155
Skeptics might also argue that candidates will waste public
funds to stay in lavish hotels or build war chests for future
paign contributions produce unwarranted expenditures or tax relief is beyond
the scope of this Article, the allocation of tax burdens and spending priorities
certainly warrants the engagement of the broad base of citizens that results
from multiple matching funds.
152. The argument that multiple matching funds cost too much and reinforce the participation of wealthier individuals could be addressed by limiting
these programs to small contributions or less wealthy people. Such limitations
would avoid subsidizing larger contributors who would have given regardless
of the incentive, and would increase fundraisers’ incentives to mobilize smaller
donors. Incentives available only to small donors, however, could be construed
as discouraging larger contributions, and raise more constitutional concerns
under Arizona Free Enterprise. See infra Part III.C for a discussion of constitutional issues.
153. In the alternative, a jurisdiction could allocate a fixed amount of public money, and allocate money to candidates on a first-come/first-serve basis
until the money is depleted. This approach, however, may advantage early
candidates and incumbents.
154. See gt, Thursday, September 23, 2010, SOAPBOX (Sept, 23, 2010, 5:33
PM), http://ballots.blogspot.com/2010/09/recently-i-wrote-blog-post-about-how-to
.html; MAURER & DRAYE, supra note 75, at 12 (quoting former FEC Chair David Mason as saying “the presence of matching funds provides a dramatically
increased incentive for conduit contributions”).
155. See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. § 441f (2006); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-907 (2006);
TEX. ELEC. CODE. ANN.§ 253.001 (2010); FEC Contribution and Expenditure
Limitations and Prohibitions, 11 C.F.R. § 110.4 (2011).
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elections. Many public financing programs, however, contain
provisions that limit the use of public money to specific campaign-related expenses, require that leftover funds be returned
to the government, and provide for repayment or even criminal
prosecution for violations.156 Further, unlike conventional flatgrant full public financing, candidates who contemplate a misuse of matching funds on unnecessary luxuries know they will
be held accountable by past and potential contributors who
have either already invested or are considering investing their
personal funds to the campaign.
C. MULTIPLE MATCHING FUNDS ARE CONSTITUTIONAL
Multiple matching funds do not burden speech, and therefore the programs are not subject to heightened judicial scrutiny and do not pose the constitutional problems of the “trigger”
provision invalidated in Arizona Free Enterprise.
In Buckley v. Valeo, the Court upheld the constitutionality
of matching funds (a one-to-one match on the first $250 of a
contribution).157 The Court explicitly found that the program
“furthers, not abridges, pertinent First Amendment values” because it was “a congressional effort, not to abridge, restrict, or
censor speech, but rather to use public money to facilitate and
enlarge public discussion and participation in the electoral process, goals vital to a self-governing people.”158 Increasing the
match to six-to-one does nothing to “abridge, restrict, or censor”
speech, and more effectively furthers pertinent First Amendment values Buckley referenced by multiplying the money
available for public discussion and enhancing incentives for
participation.
Moreover, multiple matching funds for contributions do not
violate the holding of Arizona Free Enterprise. Although the
Supreme Court referred to the Arizona law it rendered unconstitutional as a “matching funds scheme,” the Arizona law gave
additional funds to publicly financed candidates to match the

156. See, e.g., N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE §§ 3-702(21), 3-704, 3-710 (2010) (defining “expenditure” and imposing audits and penalties for improperly spent
funds and requiring repayment of excess funds); Fair Elections Now Act, H.R.
1404, 112th Cong. §§ 103, 523, 534 (2011) ( limiting types of expenditures and
requiring repayment of improperly spent funds while also allowing for criminal investigation).
157. 424 U.S. 1, 106, 143–44 (1976) ( per curiam).
158. Id. at 92–93.
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spending of privately financed candidates.159 Unlike the trigger
provisions in Arizona Free Enterprise, multiple matching funds
for contributions are not triggered by and do not respond to the
spending of opposing candidates, independent expenditure
groups, or contributors,160 and therefore they do not burden the
speech of these entities.161
Opponents might argue that the multiple match is unconstitutional because it represents government burdening of unfettered speech. Just as the First Amendment provides for separation of church and state, opponents may argue, it also
prohibits government from interfering with politics by subsidizing particular political actors.162 These opponents might reference the following language from Arizona Free Enterprise:
[ I ]t is not legitimate for the government to attempt to equalize electoral opportunities in this manner. And such basic intrusion by the
government into the debate over who should govern goes to the heart
of First Amendment values. . . . The First Amendment embodies our
choice as a Nation that . . . the guiding principle is freedom—the “unfettered interchange of ideas”—not whatever the State may view as
fair.163
159. Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806,
2810 (2011).
160. The Court in Arizona Free Enterprise observed that unlike Arizona’s
trigger, permissible government subsidies of speech did not directly respond to
the speech of another. Id.at 2822 (“[N]one of those cases [upholding government subsidies of speech] . . . involved a subsidy given in direct response to the
political speech of another, to allow the recipient to counter that speech.”).
161. The New York City program provision that increases the spending
limit and the match from six-to-one to 8.57-to-1 if a privately financed opponent spends over a particular amount, however, is likely unconstitutional under Arizona Free Enterprise. See Larry Levy & Andrew Rafalaf, High Court’s
Recent Decision on Public Matching Funds Renders New York City’s Campaign
Finance System Ripe for Constitutional Attack, ALB. GOV’T L. REV. FIREPLACE
(July 11, 2011, 05:46 PM), http://aglr.wordpress.com/2011/07/11/high-courts-recent
-decision-on-public-matching-funds-renders-new-york-citys-campaign-finance
-system-ripe-for-constitutional-attack-2/.
162. Smith, The Separation, supra note 76 (asserting that implicit in the
U.S. Constitution is a “separation of campaign and state” principle that government should have no role in subsidizing campaigns). While the power of
state and local governments to subsidize private industry (e.g., sporting arenas) is sometimes limited by state constitutions, these limitations usually apply only when a specific and identifiable private beneficiary exists rather than
a broader group of beneficiaries, such as all citizens. Brent Bordson, Note,
Public Sports Stadium Funding: Communities Being Held Hostage by Professional Sports Team Owners, 21 HAMLINE L. REV. 505, 508–09 (1998) (noting
some state constitutional provisions require that public finances serve a “public purpose”).
163. Ariz. Free Enter., 131 S. Ct. at 2826 (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14); cf.
Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 742 (2008) (“Leveling electoral opportunities
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These arguments are unpersuasive. First, as discussed
above, dicta in Arizona Free Enterprise referenced a trigger
that, unlike multiple matching of contributions, was deemed to
deter speech.164 Further, the Buckley Court explicitly rejected a
libertarian “separation of campaign and state” argument, holding that any analogy to separation of church and state was “patently inapplicable” because the Establishment Clause was intended to prevent religious persecution, whereas the Speech
Clause was intended to advance robust public debate.165 First
Amendment text prohibiting the “establishment” of religion differs from text prohibiting Congress from “abridging” speech.166
Multiple matching funds do not abridge speech but instead “use
public money to facilitate and enlarge public discussion and
participation in the electoral process . . . .”167 Congress possesses the power to provide financial support for speech,168 and it
has properly done so in contexts as varied as public broadcasting, educational media, preferential postal rates for newspapers, and antitrust exemptions.169
Multiple matching funds do not discriminate against larger
contributors.170 Six-to-one matching funds on the first $200 of a
means making and implementing judgments about which strengths should be
permitted to contribute to the outcome of an election. . . . [I]t is a dangerous
business for Congress to use the election laws to influence the voters’ choices.”).
164. See supra text accompanying note 160.
165. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 92–93 & n.127.
166. Id. at 92.
167. Id. at 92–93.
168. Id. at 90–91 (determining that Congress has the power to provide public subsidies to politics due to its authority to regulate federal elections and to
decide which expenditures will promote the general welfare).
169. Id. at 93 n.127.
170. Some might argue that multiple matching funds that subsidize only
the contributions of in-district or in-state donors favor the speech of locals over
others and constitute viewpoint discrimination. See MAURER & DRAYE, supra
note 75, at 3 (“[R]elegating out-of-state contributions to second-class status
undermines . . . the federal right to free speech and association . . . .”). This
claim should fail. The in-district requirement would not prohibit out-of-district
contributions, but simply would not subsidize them with public funds. The
First Amendment allows government to allocate funds using neutral criteria
that do not lend themselves to viewpoint-based discrimination. See Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 614 –15 (1998) (Souter, J., dissenting). Residency is a neutral factor unrelated to political party, ideology, or
other viewpoint, and is utilized in a variety of electoral contexts (e.g., candidates must often live in the district in which they run, petition signatures are
often deemed valid only if they are of a resident of the district, and voting is
generally limited to residents of a district). Furthermore, the viewpoints expressed by both out-of-district and in-district donors are often identical (e.g.,
support for the candidate), and thus the decision to match one donation and
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contribution are available to all donors, large and small.171 The
fact that matching funds match only the first $200 of a $1000
donor’s contribution does not burden the larger contributor’s
speech.
Those challenging multiple matching funds may also argue
that the program impermissibly restricts speech by decreasing
the relative value of larger contributions.172 For example, without the match, a $1000 contribution is worth five times as much
as a $200 donation. With a six-to-one match on the first $200,
however, a $1000 contribution (which works out to $2200) is
worth only 1.57 times as much as a $200 contribution (which
nets the candidate $1400). This extensive decrease in the value
of larger contributions relative to smaller contributions, challengers might argue, fundamentally differs from the decrease
that stems from the one-to-one match upheld in Buckley.
Courts should reject this “relative value” burden argument.
The argument requires difficult line-drawing exercises: Does a
match become unconstitutional at two-to-one, three-to-one, or
four-to-one? Further, interpreting diminishing relative value as
a burden on speech would require invalidation of laws in various other areas, including public broadcasting and government
funding for the arts. Judicial invalidation of multiple matching
funds would restrict the speech of smaller contributors in order
not the other is not related to the expressive content of the donation. See
Herschaft v. N.Y.C. Campaign Fin. Bd., 127 F. Supp. 2d 164, 168 (E.D.N.Y.
2000) (noting that New York City “plainly has a substantial interest in ensuring that public” matching funds are “given only to those candidates that have
the requisite support within their district and that have received legitimate
matchable contributions from New York City residents.”); see also Finley, 524
U.S. at 596 (Scalia, J., concurring) (asserting that “[i]t is preposterous to
equate the denial of taxpayer subsidy with measures ‘aimed at the suppression of ’ . . . speech” (emphasis omitted)).
171. Granted, multiple matching funds might change a prospective donor’s
incentives to give the matched amount (e.g., a $200 contribution in a system
that gives a six-to-one match on the first $200)—which may encourage some
smaller donors to give more and larger donors to give less. Simple changing of
incentives, however, does not constitute a burden or restraint on speech, as
contributors are free to give more money, and no opposing spending or contributions will be triggered by their decision to do so.
172. Opponents could also claim multiple matching funds discriminate
based on wealth by increasing the relative influence of small donors in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Multiple matching funds do not exclude
larger donors, however, but allow them to take advantage of the multiple
match on the first $200. Even in the unlikely event the multiple match is
deemed a wealth-based classification, rational basis review (not heightened
scrutiny) would apply, see San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
1, 54 –55 (1973), and the multiple match likely would be upheld.
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to enhance the relative voice of larger contributors, which “is
wholly foreign to the First Amendment.”173
The argument that the multiple match burdens the speech
of larger contributors is also flawed because the Court has held
that contributions do not contain the same expressive value as
expenditures.174 Thus, the Court has found that a contribution
limit “involves little direct restraint on [a person’s] political
communication, for it permits the symbolic expression of support evidenced by a contribution but does not in any way infringe the contributor’s freedom to discuss candidates and issues.”175 The multiple match is less problematic than a
contribution limit, as the multiple match involves no restraint
on the larger contributor’s political communication, but instead
enhances it by applying the match.
While some public finance opponents may suggest that any
campaign finance rules that “level the playing field” are unconstitutional,176 this equality rationale is prohibited only for laws
that burden speech. Laws that burden speech are subject to
heightened scrutiny, and the Court has indicated that prevention of corruption and the appearance of corruption are the only
permissible justifications for restricting political money.177 The
Court has repeatedly invalidated campaign finance restrictions
173. Cf. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48–49 (1976) ( per curiam) (“[T]he
concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the
First Amendment . . . .”).
174. See id. at 20–21 (comparing expenditures to contributions, and observing that “[a] contribution serves as a general expression of support for the
candidate and his views, but does not communicate the underlying basis for
the support. The quantity of communication by the contributor does not increase perceptibly with the size of his contribution, since the expression rests
solely on the undifferentiated, symbolic act of contributing”). The triggers invalidated in Davis and Arizona Free Enterprise were deemed to burden expenditures, not contributions.
175. Id. at 21; accord Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 737 (2008) (“This Court
has previously sustained the facial constitutionality of limits on discrete and
aggregate individual contributions and on coordinated party expenditures.”).
176. See MAURER & DRAYE, supra note 75 (asserting the “Court has condemned regulations with the purpose of equalizing the opportunities for
speech. . . . The only government interest . . . sufficiently compelling to support
campaign finance rules is the prevention of corruption or the appearance of
corruption.” (footnotes omitted)).
177. FEC v. Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 496–
97 (1985) (“We held in Buckley and reaffirmed in Citizens Against Rent Control that preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption are the only
legitimate and compelling government interests . . . for restricting campaign
finances.”).
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designed to promote equality.178 Multiple matching of contributions does not burden speech, however, and conceptually the
justification for the program need not be prevention of corruption but could include promoting equality.179
To minimize litigation risk in the unlikely event a court
characterizes multiple matching funds as a burden on speech;
however, legislators should enact multiple matching funds to
help prevent corruption, not to promote equality. Multiple
matching programs prevent quid pro quo corruption by increasing participation and diversifying a candidate’s support so she
is less beholden to a narrow group of donors.180 Although leveling the playing field between average citizens and wealthy special interests may be politically effective rhetoric, officials
should avoid bill text, legislative record language, press releases, website statements, and other language that suggests that a
purpose of multiple matching funds is to equalize contributors
or to diminish or dilute the influence of larger contributors.
CONCLUSION
Public financing should no longer aim to purge private
money from politics, but should instead encourage as many cit178. Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806,
2826 (2011) (stating that equalizing opportunities is “a dangerous enterprise
and one that cannot justify burdening protected speech”); Davis, 554 U.S. at
741 (stating that precedential cases “provide no support for the proposition
that [equalizing candidates] is a legitimate government objective”); Buckley,
424 U.S. at 54 (holding that the interest in equalizing the relative financial
resources of candidates competing for elective office “is clearly not sufficient to
justify the provision’s infringement of fundamental First Amendment rights”).
179. The Court referenced a similar rationale with approving language in
Buckley. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 107 (“The thrust of [matching funds] is to
reduce financial barriers and to enhance the importance of smaller contributions.” (footnote omitted)).
180. See supra text accompanying notes 69–71. One could assert that the
primary anticorruption benefit of multiple matching funds is to reduce the
possibility of corruption by supplanting large contributions with small contributions and public money. The five Justices in the majority of Citizens United
and Arizona Free Enterprise likely see monetary participation of all sizes as
essential to hold politicians accountable to the people, however, and thus a
“supplant large contributions” theory of prevention of corruption will likely fail
to persuade a majority of justices. Indeed, such a theory may lead public financing skeptics to characterize multiple matching funds as an attempt to restrain the speech of larger contributors that warrants heightened scrutiny. See
MAURER & DRAYE, supra note 75, at 17–19 (characterizing the Fair Election
Now Act’s goal of reducing the significance of large contributors as an attempt
to silence these donors). For further discussion of how the multiple match prevents corruption, see supra Part III.B.
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izens as possible to participate in financing politics. Federal,
state, and local lawmakers should transform their approach to
public financing by adopting multiple matching of contributions. Multiple matching funds increase citizen participation,
reduce the potential for corruption, and comply with the
Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence.

